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AFTERWORD
CONFERRING ABOUT THE CONFERENCEt
Jessica Silbey*
Aaron Perzanowski** &
Marketa Trimble***
Jessica Silbey:
We heard at the conference five rich papers, all addressing in
one way or another the conference's theme: "ReCalibrating
Copyright: Continuity, Contemporary Culture, and Change."
Professor Craig Joyce, in his capacity as conference convener,
asked us as Fellows, at the end of the day of presentations and
discussions, how we thought the Presenters' papers spoke to each
other and to the conference's focus.
One perennial question about law reform, and a question the
scholars at the conference addressed, either implicitly or explicitly,
is: how does the reform start? By this I mean, literally, does reform
begin with a big picture sea change or a series of small-scale
tweaks? Professor Wendy Gordon's paper begins with the big
picture, asking a very basic but important question about the role
of copyright: can or should copyright law be understood to
authorize exclusive rights for the purpose of aiding noncreative
disseminators? With this question, Gordon takes issue with two
Supreme Court cases, Eldred and Golan, making a persuasive case
for why encouraging authorship and not distribution of works is
the sole function of copyright law. From this fundamental critique
of Supreme Court doctrine and copyright scholarship supporting
it, Professor Gordon draws the intriguing conclusion that the right
t The Fellows' commentary is based on the papers in their original form as delivered at
the Conference and without reference to subsequent revisions to the papers by the Presenters.
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.
** Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
*** Associate Professor of Law, UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law.
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of dissemination should be understood to protect authors' interests
and that when the right does not incentivize creativity, but
benefits distributors' interests only, in a standalone fashion,
dissemination effects should be irrelevant to assessing the breadth
and validity of the copyright statute. Were we to engage in an
overhaul of the copyright laws, which Professor Gordon
encourages, we should do so, she says, from the perspective of
incentivizing creativity by authors, not by focusing on
incentivizing dissemination (except as it helps the copyright owner
catch infringing copies).
Professor Thomas Nachbar evaluates our copyright system
less from a ground-zero approach and, instead, mobilizes critical
legal concepts-rules and standards-to ask whether our
copyright system is properly calibrated to optimize allocations of
rights to creators and users. He concludes that the fuzzier
standard is optimal when evaluated at critical times of decision
(whether to make or use a creative work). This conclusion
counterintuitively undermines the more frequent call to clearer
rules in copyright to promote access.
Professors Jacqueline Lipton, Lydia Pallas Loren, and
Olufunmilayo Arewa approach the copyright reform question at
the most detailed level of tweaks and particular rule changes. All
three in their analysis ask important questions about the
productivity and ongoing practices of particular creative
communities. The level of detail about the creative industries
(fanfiction, digital music distributors, and African American
musical genres) underscores how small changes in a highly
complex system could make meaningful differences in the
achievement of underlying copyright policies.
Aaron Perzanowski:
I agree that each of the approaches we see represented in
these papers has its own merit. Considering an alternate past of
copyright frees us from the path dependence that limits our ability
to imagine its future. Thinking systematically about copyright
law's relationship to available information helps us separate rules
and standards from their substantive outcomes. And paying
careful attention to the legal, social, and marketplace conditions
facing creators informs our theorizing about copyright's structure
and purpose by revealing the often messy facts about creative
practice.
From my perspective, one common element shared by these
papers is an interest in copyright law's relationship with
temporality. Copyright policy tends to keep one eye on the future
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creators that its incentive structure is designed to motivate and
the other eye on the incumbent rights holders and intermediaries
that dominate today's cultural landscape. To some extent, each of
these papers is concerned with the balance between the forward-
and backward-looking tendencies of the copyright system and the
relative weight we assign the interests of past and future creators.
Lydia Pallas Loren's critique of music licensing is in part a story
about compensating creators of past works at the expense of future
market entrants. Olufunmilayo Arewa highlights the problems
that develop when we enshrine the creative practices and
assumptions of a previous era in ways that are inconsistent with
prevailing contemporary expressive forms. In Jacqueline Lipton's
work, we see an effort to reconcile the rights of authors and
publishers with the follow-on creativity that inevitably develops in
their wake. Wendy Gordon usefully distinguishes between the
sometimes-conflicting goals of encouraging the creation of new
works and the dissemination of existing ones. And Thomas
Nachbar demonstrates that the choice between rules and
standards is informed by temporal considerations, namely,
whether and when information is available to creators and users
of copyrighted works.
On the whole, these discussions reveal that, for a system that
is designed to encourage future creativity, copyright law often
privileges the past. By favoring established interests rather than
the next wave of creativity and innovation, copyright reveals itself
as surprisingly backward-looking. In part, I'd suggest this
tendency to favor the creators of the past is a result of copyright
policy's failure to clearly articulate a vision of its intended effect.
Copyright's goals remain rather amorphous. We expect the
copyright system to result in more creativity, to produce stuff. But
beyond that, copyright policy has avoided considerations of what
kind of stuff, produced by whom, and for whom. Copyright law
should not, and probably cannot, provide definitive answers to
those questions. But by ignoring them, copyright law has failed to
imagine the range of futures available to us all. And without some
positive vision or visions of the output of the system, copyright law
becomes more susceptible to the backward-looking lens that favors
incumbents and deemphasizes future creativity.
Marketa Trimble:
Identifying optimal goals for copyright policy is a crucial task;
however, the search for goals should not overshadow the need to
identify the appropriate means to achieve the goals. Whether they
suggest systemic changes or small adjustments to. the copyright
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regime, all five papers suggest the need to identify the appropriate
means for the changes and adjustments.
What limits the implementation of any major systemic
changes to the copyright regime, such as the changes suggested by
Wendy Gordon, is the current international copyright regime,
which does not allow any country-party to the regime to undertake
major systemic changes to its copyright system that are
inconsistent with the international regime; a country would only
make inconsistent changes if it were not concerned about its
international obligations stemming from the regime. However,
that the present international regime exists, binds its signatories,
and is unlikely to be changed in the foreseeable future (given the
current state of international intellectual property law
negotiations) should not foreclose the exploration of alternatives
to the current copyright regime. Further, the flexibilities built
(intentionally or unintentionally) into the international copyright
regime provide leeway for countries to undertake certain changes
within the framework of the regime.
All five papers refer to the U.S. copyright regime, but their
analyses are informative for copyright law reform discussions
globally. Thomas Nachbar's analysis of the role for rules and
standards in copyright law certainly applies internationally. In
Europe, scholars have discussed the possibility of changing from
rule-based provisions to standard-based provisions when they
have contemplated the possibility of switching from enumerated
exceptions to copyright to a fair use provision (or complementing
exceptions with a fair use provision). The justification given in
Europe for adopting the proposed standard is the necessity for
sufficient flexibility to facilitate technological progress. However,
the European proposals have paid insufficient attention (as have
the U.S. proposals that are commented on by Nachbar) to the
rule/standard distinction and have not adequately assessed the
appropriateness of the two types of means and the costs that arise
when suboptimal means are selected to pursue goals.
Olufunmilayo Arewa suggests in her paper the negative
effects that copyright law historically might have had on European
classical music; because copyright law discourages improvisation,
it prevents music from developing organically through
incremental changes that reflect the preferences of its audience.
While copyright protection might encourage composers to
experiment and produce music that achieves the necessary level of
originality that copyright law perceives as deserving of protection,
copyright protection might at the same time contribute to the
music departing from the generally shared tastes of its audience.
The effect of copyright on musical works may be similar to the
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effect that copyright might have on computer programs; copyright
incentivizes computer program developers, as it does music
composers, to depart from established, time-tested, and
understandable patterns. If improvisation is an essential form of
musical creation, does copyright offer any means to encourage
improvisation while not depriving composers of their exclusive
rights? Perhaps the solution is a matter of appropriate delineation
of the sufficient minimal creativity required for copyright
protection of a musical work, or perhaps, the solution is a different
form of protection for the various stages in the development of a
musical work.
Lydia Pallas Loren and Jacqueline Lipton also highlight the
importance of selecting a means for achieving the optimal goals of
copyright policy in their papers. Professor Lipton analyzes the
facets of fanfiction as a very specific literary creation and shows
how private actor intervention can easily alter the status of some
fanfiction as a fair use of the underlying work. Professor Loren's
review of the history and present status of the royalty rate setting
processes suggests that antitrust enforcement against
performance rights organizations may counterintuitively result in
an even stronger position for the organizations; the organizations
seem to succumb to incumbent lobbying to such an extent that the
role of the organizations as nongovernmental actors may be
questioned. A component of the process of selecting the
appropriate means is to identify appropriate actors to design,
implement, and manage the means. A preference for certain policy
goals may influence the desire for the involvement of certain types
of actors; the selection of actors, however, should not drive the
identification of the appropriate means.
Jessica:
I agree that thinking more systematically about
"appropriate means"-be that institutional or particularized
processes-is important. And certainly considering what are the
concrete goals of copyright-what is the "progress" the
Constitution contemplates-is paramount. During the
workshop, Wendy Gordon and Thomas Nachbar had an
animated discussion about this last point. Thomas's paper
focuses primarily on processes-whether rules or standards are
optimal in light of the access to relevant information at
particular decision points regarding creation and use. Wendy's
paper justifies identifying the primary goal of copyright as
incentivizing creativity and proceeds to explain how the current
overly complex system of exclusive rights and limitations should
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be (and could effectively be) trimmed to achieve that particular
goal. Thomas thought that, without agreement on the
substantive harms and benefits of the system (what is
"progress"?), focusing on process makes the most sense. (And
that goes to your international harmonization point, Marketa.).
In discussion, Wendy did not seem to agree entirely. And, as her
paper describes, by justifying copyright protection only by its
ability to further the creation of new works of authorship,
Wendy is explicitly describing "progress" in this way.
As Aaron suggests, there can be reasonable debate about
whether there is a definable scope to "progress," separate from
process. Does the constitutional mandate of progress care about
what kind of works are created? Or, just how many? Does it care
about how the works are created or to whom they are accessible?
Reckoning with the substantive contours of "progress" seems
important and yet often goes unstated. There is some work on this
topic but not nearly as much as one would think, given how central
the term is to the idea of intellectual property and its regulation.
Implicit in Jacqueline and Olufunmilayo's papers is that
creative work-the existence of an output-is less important to
"progress" than creative practice itself. Jacqueline's description
of the values of fanfiction and the problematic licensing
transactions by which it is being commercialized through Kindle
Worlds implies that restrictions on the practice of writing
fanfiction (how one writes, in conversation with whom and what
possible limitations exist with regard to content and character)
undermine copyright progress. Olufunmilayo's similarly focuses
on how the copyright rule of fixation privileges written music
for protection, which undermines long-standing and generative
practices of music production based on performance and the
nonvisual aspects of music (e.g., timbre and rhythm) central to
African American cultural traditions.
By contrast, Lydia's paper reflects Marketa's point about
process and institutions as a proper focus of improving
copyright and (implicitly) promoting "progress." Without
focusing on the kind of music or the way music is produced,
Lydia's paper critiques the disparate effects of the rate-setting
system for music distribution and its protection of incumbents.
Her paper is an implicit plug for "progress" as directly related
to dissemination and access to work.
None of these papers suggest the clean distinction I am
making between dissemination and creation as attributes of
progress, but it is worth paying attention to implicit or explicit
emphases on both as we engage in conversations about reform.
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Aaron:
I'm interested in the degree to which it is possible and useful
to separate process and institutions from substance in a
conversation about reform. I certainly see the conceptual value in
distinguishing between them. But I'm somewhat skeptical about
our ability to practically disentangle their impact on reform.
Marketa's example of international obligations might help
illustrate this difficulty. The primary hurdles those obligations
create are undoubtedly institutional and procedural. But there is
a deeply embedded substantive reform agenda favoring large
copyright holders built into the choice to rely on international
institutions and processes. As Congress becomes a less hospitable
vehicle for that agenda, we've seen an increasing focus on the
achieving change through the backdoor of international
agreements.
Although Wendy and Thomas's papers focus on opposite sides
of the divide between substance and process, they both implicitly
embrace the notion that we can derive insight from thinking about
one aspect in isolation. Wendy's thought experiment, whether
derived from pure common law reasoning or constitutional
principles, is an effort to elevate copyright policy above the
institutional shortcomings that she rightly blames for the
expansion of the copyright term. Thomas's effort to divorce the
procedural choice between rules and standards from any
substantive policy in many ways presents the mirror image of
Wendy's approach.
The other papers are less concerned with the abstract and
more focused on the inevitable interactions of substantive
outcomes-both legal and creative-and process and institutions.
Jacqueline worries about the ways market mechanisms could
influence the substance of both legal and creative outcomes. Lydia
raises concerns about the impact of legal institutions of the
legislative, judicial, and regulatory variety on license fees facing
new market entrants. And Olufunmilayo highlights the complex
interplay between creative practice and legal institutions. While
both of these general approaches have value, they reveal
something about our authors' assessments of the relative
importance of substantive and procedural concerns in the reform
process.
Marketa:
Aaron states that international institutions and processes
favor large copyright holders; I view the current situation
differently. Multinational efforts, such as ACTA, and other trade
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agreements since TRIPS, have been driven by attempts to
strengthen copyright protection, particularly through more
effective (or more aggressive, depending on one's perspective)
enforcement-goals that large copyright holders promote.
However, the failure of ACTA and the conclusion of the latest two
international treaties (the 2012 Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual
Performances and the 2013 Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access
to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired,
or Otherwise Print Disabled) do not evidence victories by large
copyright holders at the international level. Critics may doubt that
the Beijing Treaty is useful as a data point in projecting the
trajectory of international copyright negotiations; the Beijing
Treaty was in the making for a long time. However, as some
commentators have suggested, and as some large copyright
holders fear, the Marrakesh Treaty might be a groundbreaking
milestone delineating a trajectory that will place more emphasis
on the interests of copyright users than the interests of copyright
holders. Large copyright holders are concerned that the
Marrakesh Treaty might have opened the door to negotiations of
additional mandatory exceptions and limitations to copyright.
Industry groups and other stakeholders regularly turn to
international negotiations (or negotiations at regional levels) in
the hope that the resulting international treaties (or regional
instruments) will promote stakeholder interests and force national
legislatures to implement corresponding national legislations that
will favor stakeholder interests. All the large stakeholders today,
and not only the large copyright holders, realize the importance of
international policymaking and exert influence at the individual
national levels and at the international level. The question is
whether national legislatures, such as the United States Congress,
are more receptive or less receptive to particular stakeholder
voices than are the representatives of the national executive
branches and officials of international organizations-
representatives and officials who are typically instrumental in
negotiating international treaties.
New incumbents play an important role in determining how
national and international policies are shaped; notwithstanding
concerns that current copyright policies help entrench existing
incumbents (a concern that Wendy and Lydia's papers emphasize),
new stakeholders emerge who overtake the role of incumbents. In
some instances, new incumbent interests eventually align with old
incumbent interests, as Jacqueline's example of Kindle Worlds
demonstrates; in other instances, new incumbents bring their own
interests. Typically, incumbents cast their interests as identical to
or parallel to the interests of other established stakeholders with
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whom the general public can identify: large copyright holders
present their interests as aligned with those of authors and
performers; and Internet service providers portray their interests
as extensions of the interests of Internet users. We may wonder
how society's policy preferences and allegiances will develop when
today more Internet users are also becoming authors; as the
Internet generation grows older and provides for their families and
their retirements, this generation may view free content creation
and sharing on the Internet differently than it did one or two
decades ago. Jacqueline's observations about the developments in
fanfiction might indicate a trend of monetization of user-created
content as a manifestation of changing perceptions about the role
of copyright with respect to user-created content.
Jessica:
Marketa, your point is well taken that yesterday's disruptive
entrants are tomorrow's incumbents, and that productive
allegiances may form between disruptive entrants and established
stakeholders. Lydia's paper comparing the development of
performance rights organizations with that of Internet radio
services makes these points by example.
What her paper also highlights is the diversity of institutional
mechanisms through which these tensions may be worked out-
and how, to Aaron's point, the same substantive values may
nonetheless repeat and entrench themselves. Lydia's paper
identifies these repeating values as particular narratives
animating institutional decisions charged with determining the
proper licensing terms for music performances. These institutions
include the Copyright Office, the Copyright Royalty Board,
privately negotiated agreements, and court decisions overseeing
antitrust decrees, all across a 100-year history. Despite the
profound changes within the music industry during that time and
the diversity of institutions tasked with shaping music copyright,
Lydia identifies two primary narratives that explain the
substantive outcomes: (1) maintaining fair remuneration in light
of changing music technology; and (2) protecting the status quo of
large incumbent entities from competition wrought by new music
technologies and business models. If Lydia is right that no matter
the nature of the institution-be it private, quasi-governmental,
or judicial-these two narratives drive institutional decisions
(narratives being stories with a moral or a point), her paper speaks
to the irrelevance of the institution for reform purposes and the
importance of identifying and authorizing or rejecting the
fundamental values being promulgated and protected.
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Aaron:
I appreciate Marketa's optimism about international
processes, although I don't share it. But her accurate description
of the recent changes in the fortunes of large copyright interests
shows that the interplay of procedural and substantive
considerations is not necessarily static. I think that underscores
my broader point that it's difficult to talk sensibly about reform
without understanding the dynamic relationships between
processes, institutions, and substantive outcomes.
So while it might be the case that the driving narratives are
consistent across institutions when it comes to music licensing
today, we shouldn't necessarily expect that sort of consistency
over time and across the full range of potential reform
opportunities. In another context, institutional choice could be
crucial. Perhaps the courts would resolve the questions
Jacqueline raises about commercial fanfiction very differently
than Amazon would, for example. So some sensitivity to and
awareness of that context strikes me as an important part of the
effort to think through copyright's future. Papers like Thomas
and Wendy's make valuable contributions but are most useful
when their insights are situated within a broader contextual
understanding.
Marketa:
Aaron draws our attention to the dynamic relationships
among processes, institutions, and substantive policies, and
rightly emphasizes the need to analyze the three components as
the parts of a single puzzle whose individual components should
complement each other within a given context. Often when we
think about a recalibration of copyright we think solely of
recalibrating the interests of various stakeholders in the
substance of copyright law; the focus on the substance of
copyright policy is understandable, and, as Jessica suggests, a
search for the optimal substantive recalibration of copyright
should be society's paramount goal and should involve the
questioning of even the basic premises of copyright policy. All
five papers presented at this conference in some form address
the complexity that is involved in the process of a recalibration
of copyright. The complexity created by the intricate web of
interests embedded in the substance of copyright policy makes
the recalibration of copyright challenging; and the recalibration
is made even more complex by the fact that the substantive law
changes must be accompanied also by appropriate changes to
processes and institutions.
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As legal scholars, we are fortunate to be able to participate in
the response to momentous societal and technological changes
that affect changes also in the copyright laws during this period.
Digital technologies have opened possibilities for an
unprecedented large-scale public engagement with copyright
policy because the technologies are facilitating an environment in
which more and more people are becoming authors, users, and
disseminators of content. The five papers on which we have the
pleasure to comment are important pieces of legal scholarship.
They offer valuable windows into the complexities of copyright law
recalibration in our swiftly changing society.

